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TAXATION
COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS-
A QUESTION OF INTENT
DOUGLAS W. CONNER
Section 341 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is de-
signed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into long
term capital gain through the use of a "collapsible" corpora-
tion.' The "collapsible" corporation was used quite success-
fully as a tax avoidance device in the motion picture industry.
To illustrate, a corporation would be organized to produce one
motion picture. After completion of the picture but before the
realization of any income, the corporation would be liquidated
and its assets distributed to the shareholders who would then
pay a tax on the difference between the basis of their stock and
the fair market value of the distributed assets. Thus the corpo-
ration would pay no tax because it realized no income, and the
stockholders' gain would be taxed as a long term capital gain.
The fair market value of the film would be amortized against
the income therefrom as it was received. There would be no
further tax unless the income from the film exceeded the fair
market value thereof. 2
In the construction industry, the "collapsible" corporation
device also met with a high degree of success. A corporation
would be formed to construct a housing project. The corpora-
tion would be "collapsed" as soon as construction was com-
pleted and before any income was realized. The assets would be
distributed and a valuation placed thereon based on the ex-
pected selling price of the buildings. A capital gain tax was
paid on the difference between the basis of the stock and ex-
pected selling price.3
The same tax benefits illustrated previously could also be
obtained without a liquidation. The shareholders could sell
their stock to outside interests before any income had been
1 This name is somewhat of a misnomer in that the provisions of section 341
are so broad as to apply to corporations which are not actually "collapsible."
2 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. § 2484.
33B IERTEN'S LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.55
(1961).
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realized by the corporation and enjoy the same preferential
treatment of the gain derived therefrom. Also, the corporation
might distribute the "collapsible" assets without liquidating
and under the provisions of Section 301(c) of the 1954 Code4
the value of the property distributed would first be applied
against the adjusted basis of the stock and any excess would be
taxable as a long term capital gain. 5
The Internal Revenue Service met with little success in its
attempt to curb the use of this tax avoidance device. 6 Realizing
that the existing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were
inadequate, the Service sought legislation to close this tax
"loophole." Section 212 of the Revenue Act of 19507 was
designed to do just that.
Section 117(m)8 converted the gain derived by the share-
holders of a "collapsible" corporation into ordinary income in
the following situations:
(1) The sale or exchange of stock of a collapsible corporation.
(2) A distribution in partial or complete liquidation of a col-
lapsible corporation, which distribution is treated as pay-
ment in exchange for stock.
(3) A distribution by the corporation which, to the extent it
exceeds the basis of the stock, is treated in the same man-
ner as a gain from the sale or exchange of property.
For a corporation to be characterized as a "collapsible"
corporation it must be,
... formed or availed of principally for the manufacture,
construction, or production of property, for the purchase of
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 115(d), 53 Star. 47 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 301).
5 R. I. A. FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR, § 4401.
6 Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F.Supp. 369 (1952); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376
(1955); Jack Benny, 25 T.C. 197 (1955); Commissioner v. Gross, 236
F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956); Frank E. Gilman, 14 T.C. 833 (1950).
7 Revenue Act of 1950 § 212, 64 Stat. 934 (1950).
8INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117 (M), 64 Stat. 934 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 341).
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property which (in the hands of the corporation) is property
described in paragraph (3) ("section 341 assets", which
comprise inventoriable goods and receivables from the sale
of such goods and depreciable and real property used in
trade or business) or for the holding of stock in a corpo-
ration so formed or availed of, with a view to:
(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders, or a
distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by the
corporation ... of a substantial part of the taxable income
to be derived from such property and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable
to such property. 9
This definition is verbose and confusing and has proven to
be a veritable breeding ground for litigation. The most litigated
point in the entire section is the question of when the "view to
the sale" must arise. This involves a question of subjective in-
tent. The Treasury Department attempted to clarify this point
by the publication of Regulation 1.341-2(9) (3).
A corporation is formed or availed of with the view to
the action described in section 341(b) if the requisite view
existed at any time during ... construction. Thus, if the
sale, exchange, or distribution is attributed solely to circum-
stances which arose after the ... construction (other than
circumstances which reasonably could be anticipated at the
time of such... construction) the corporation shall, in the
absence of compelling facts to the contrary, be considered
not to have been so formed or availed of. 10
This Regulation would appear to resolve the question,
but it has only compounded the confusion. In Burge v. Com-
missioner, the court states, "It is not necessary that the 'view'
exist at the time the corporation is formed. It is sufficient that it
exists when the corporation is 'availed of'." 1" The U. S. Court of
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b). (The provision dealing with the
purchase of section 341 assets was adopted by section 326(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1951).
10 Treas. Reg § 1.341-2 (a) (3) (1955) (identical to Treas. Reg. 39.117 (M)-
1 (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
1"253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
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Appeals for the 2nd Circuit agrees with this interpretation as
indicated by the language in Glickman v. Commissioner:
We agree with Judge Parker's statement in Burge .... Since
the corporation may at any time during its corporate life be
"availed of" for the proscribed purpose (subject, of course,
to the limitations imposed by section 117(m)(3)), it seems
surprising that the Regulations have adopted a narrower
interpretation of the statute, and require the requisite view
to exist "during the construction . . . "or to be attributable
to "circumstances which reasonably could be anticipated
at the time of such ... construction." We are disposed to
disagree with so narrow an interpretation. 12
The language from the preceding cases is no more than dicta,
however, since in both cases the taxpayer was found to have had
the requisite intent during construction.
The Tax Court indicated its agreement with this interpreta-
tion in the case of Rose Sidney:
Since the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
recently indicated in Glickman ... its concurrence in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Burge ... to the effect that "[ijt is sufficient that [the view]
exist when the corporation is 'availed of' and the corpora-
tion may at any time during its corporate life be 'availed of'
for the proscribed purpose regardless of the time of com-
pletion of construction in relation to the time of the exis-
tence of the view, this argument of petitioners would not be
of avail to them even if we were to accept the testimony of
these witnesses as accurate." 13
Needless to say, this view is not shared by all. A line of cases
holds in accordance with the Regulation. 14 InJacobson v. Com-
missioner, the court states:
On the face of the statute Congress is here indicating a state
12256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
1330 T.C. 1155 (1958).
14 Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); Jacobson v. Com-
missioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3rd Cir. 1960); C. J. Riley, 35 T.C. 617
(1961).
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of mind which must attend and gives significance to certain
action. That action... is not merely any formation or use
of a corporation but rather the formation or use of a corpo-
ration to construct or produce property. The "view" with
which a corporation is used for a particular purpose must
necessarily be a view entertained at the time of such use.
Thus only by a distorting disregard of the phrase "for the
construction of property" is it possible to reach the con-
clusion that the "view to sale" contemplated by the statute
can arise for the first time in connection with corporate
activity after the work of construction is completed. 1
These two divergently opposed views serve to point out the
real culprit, the ambiguity ofthe statute" . . . which stems from
its awkward and lengthy configuration of words and phrases,
which seem to tumble upon each other with increasing con-
fusion."'o6 It is difficult to tell whether the word "principally"
in Section 341 refers only to "manufacture. .. " or also to
"with a view to." The Regulations have no trouble with this
point. They state that the "view" requirement is satisfied
"whether such action was contemplated unconditionally, con-
ditionally, or as a recognized possibility." 17 If all that is re-
quired is that the "view" be a "recognized possibility", then the
subjective test is virtually eliminated.
Two cases have attempted to resolve this question without
going quite so far as the Regulations. In Weill v. Commissioner
the court states:
We read the word "principally" as modifying the phrase
"manufacture... ". Under this reading, the corporation
may be treated as collapsible if "manufacture. . . " was a
principal corporate activity even if the "view to" collapse
was not the principal corporate objective when the corpora-
tion was "formed or availed of".' 8
15 281 F.2d 703 (3rd Cir., 1960).
16 3B MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 22.58
(1961).
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (2) (1955).
18 Weill v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir., 1958).
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In Burge v. Commissioner, the court states in a footnote as
follows:
The argument that the word "principally" in the statute
should be construed to modify the "view" that the statute
requires instead of "for the manufacture. . . " is without
support of any rule of law or of grammar with which we are
familiar. 1 9
It should be noted however that both of these courts as well
as the Commissioner advocate an objective test, and such a
result is necessary in order to apply this test. So there might be
an element of forced rationalization involved. However, these
are problems of semantics. The questions which arise cannot
be resolved by scrutinizing the statute, but only by trying to
ascertain the Congressional intent behind Section 341. The
Committee Reports of the Revenue Act of 1950 describe a
collapsible corporation as " . . . a device whereby one or more
individuals attempt to convert the profits from their participa-
tion in a project from income taxable at ordinary rates to long-
term capital gain taxable only at a rate of twenty-five per
cent."20 In the Hearings before the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives there appears this
exchange:
Mr. Mills. Should the legislation be specific and include
definite standards, or should it be rather general and per-
missive of great discretion in the Internal Revenue Service?
Mr. Lynch. (Thomas J. Lynch, General Counsel, Treasury
Department) We would not like to ask for great discretion.
On the other hand, we would like to be assured that the
legislation does not place in jeopardy the normal liquidation
of corporations, corporations which are organized and
carried on regularly to conduct a business.
Mr. Mills. It should be dearly understood, then, that there
is no purpose on the part of the Treasury to jeopardize the
liquidation of corporations.
19 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir., 1958).
20 1950 Cum. Bul. 449.
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Mr. Lynch. Not those that are carried on in the traditional
and regular way.21
The courts have almost unanimously treated "view to sale"
in the statute as synonymous with "intent to sell". The "view"
required by the statute is much more than an intent to sell, it is
an intent to "collapse", an intent to avoid taxes by use of a
"device" to convert ordinary income into capital gain, and not
to interfere with ligitimate business transactions which are not
prompted by tax avoidance motives. If we accept this premise
as correct then we are inexorably led to the conclusion that if
the "view" required is one of tax avoidance, then it makes no
difference when it was formed be it pre-construction or post-
construction or anything in between. On the other hand, if
there are no tax avoidance motives, if the liquidation is
prompted by legitimate business reasons, it should make no
difference when the "intent to sell" arises because it is not the
design of this statute to encompass this type of transaction.
There are three types of situations which might arise:
(1) A corporation may be formed and utilized with a subjective
intent of tax avoidance.
(2) A corporation may be formed for legitimate purposes and
later after completion of "construction" be utilized with a sub-
jective intent of tax avoidance.
(3) A corporation may be legitimately formed and later
liquidated for legitimate business reasons.
The purpose and intent of the statute would seem to be to
impose ordinary income treatment on any gain derived in
situations (1) and (2) and allow capital gains treatment on any
gain derived in situation (3). If the Burge and Glickman cases
are followed, not only would any gain derived from situations
(1) and (2) be taxed as ordinary income, but any gain derived
in situation (3) would be similarly taxed. If the Jacobson case is
followed, any gain derived in situation (3) would be afforded
2 1 Revenue Revision of 1950, HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., at 140 (1949).
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capital gains treatment, but so would any gain derived in situa-
tion (2). Neither result is satisfactory.
The result reached by the Burge and Glickman cases is
probably more in accordance with the intent and purpose of the
statute. Following the reasoning in these cases there could be
no tax avoidance in collapsible situations, but legitimate busi-
ness transactions would be impaired. However, this would be a
more equitable result than allowing tax avoidance in situation
(2) to take place. With the advent of the 1958 Technical
Amendments Act,22 any inequity in following Burge and
Glickman is greatly diminished. The shareholders under this
new provision is taxed at ordinary income rates in the event
that there is high unrealized appreciation in the "collapsible"
assets. If there is such appreciation, it is more just to tax this
gain at ordinary income rates than allow capital gains treatment
regardless of the motive behind the distribution or liquidation.
The 1958 Technical Amendments Act seems to be a step in
the right direction. Although the Committee Reports do not
expressly say so, they certainly imply that this provision was
passed to alleviate the inequities under the Burge and Glickman
cases.
The collapsible-corporation provisions of present law.
both by their terms and as interpreted, are so broad that in a
number of situations that may have exactly the opposite
effect from that intended-instead of preventing the con-
version of ordinary income into capital gain, they may in-
stead convert what would otherwise be capital gain into
ordinary income. 2 .3
It is my contention that the confusion and the divergence in
the court decisions stems from a fundamental misinterpretation
(or complete disregard) of what the collapsible corporation pro-
visions are designed to do. This misinterpretation is fostered by
the ambiguous wording of Section 341. The Congressional in-
tent and the purpose ofthe provisions seem unequivocally to
prevent tax avoidance by the use of "collapsible corporations"
22 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stats. 1606.
23 S. Rep. No. 1983, 1958-3 Cum. Bul. 953.
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and at the same time not interfere with legitimate business
transactions.
Mr. James T. Wilkes, Jr., formerly a trial attorney with the
Office of the Regional Counsel of the I. R. S., states as follows:
The ":collapsible corporation" provisions are intended
to thwart the taxpayer who by design seeks to convert
ordinary income into capital gain. Under the Burge inter-
pretation the statute would do more than this. It would
penalize the unsuspecting taxpayer who, for a valid business
purpose and after construction is completed, finds it neces-
sary to dispose of his stock interest. It is not the proper
function of the statute to hamper normal business decisions
and transactions not motivated by a desire to avoid taxes. 2 4
An excellent example of the disagreement that exists among
learned jurists as to the interpretation of the collapsible corpora-
tion provisions is contained in a recent Tax Court case. In
Maxwell Temkin, the majority opinion, one of the most erudite
ever written on "collapsible" corporations, states as follows:
There is no doubt that in the case before us Audubon [a
corporation] was -availed of" or used... to construct an
apartment house.., and there is no doubt that petitioner's
stock in Audubon was sold prior to its realization of a sub-
stantial part of the rental income to be derived. In the light
of Burge v. Commissioner and Sidney v. Commissioner, it makes
no difference whether it was so "availed of" before or after
construction of the apartment project was complete. What
prevents the application of Section 117(m) is the absence of the
proscribed "view", intent orpurpose. We think it is dear and
virtually uncontradicted by direct evidence that from its
creation petitioners had no intention to collapse Audubon
or sell their stock therein until Shapiro was so frightened by
an attack of angina and the advice of his physician that he
feared to retain any business interest which required of him
more than a minimum output of energy. (Emphasis
supplied). 25
24 Post Construction Decision to Sell Avoids Collapsibility, CA-3 Says, 13
J. TAXATION 244 (1960).
25 35 T.C. 906, 911 (1961).
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Judge Opper dissented and was joined in his dissent by four
other judges of the Tax Court. Judge Opper states:
The majority opinion asserts that "there is no doubt
that petitioner's stock in Audubon was sold prior to its
realization of a substantial part of the rental income to
be derived" and that "it makes no difference whether it
was so 'availed of' before or after construction . . . was
completed." What is apparently supposed to make the
section inapplicable is the absence of the "proscribed
view," intent or purpose. But there is only one "intent or
purpose" referred to in the statute and the opinion evi-
dently recognizes that such an "intent or purpose" namely
to dispose of the stock before the realization of a sub-
stantial part of the income, existed here. 26
The majority holding in the Temkin case is the only holding
in any case dealing with collapsible corporations that takes
full cognizance of the Congressional intent behind the statute.
The dissenting view, which is shared by many, completely
ignores this Congressional intent; it looks solely at the statute
and, as I have stated before, the statute is so ambiguously
worded that it is next to impossible to ascertain what is in-
tended.
The Congressional Hearings and the Committee Reports
speak of a "device" used for tax avoidance, of not seeking to
"jeopardize the normal liquidation of corporations". The
dissenting opinion completely ignores this.
The writers on the subject of "collapsible corporations"
are almost unanimous in their agreement that Section 341
2c 35 T.C. 906, 912 (1961). Sce also, Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144
(1959). In this case disharmony arose between the two principal stock-
holders during construction and as a result thereof a decision was made
to sell their stock. After finding that this was not the real cause of the
dissolution, the court added as dictum, "Moreover, section 117(M) is
applicable even if it be assumed that petitioners sold their stock because
of shareholders disharmony. In terms, section 117(M) requires only
that the corporation be availed of for construction with a view to the
sale of its stock prior to the realization by the corporation ot a sub-
stantial part of the net income to be derived from the property. These
conditions apply precisely to the instant case. Petitioners not only sold
their stock prior to the realization of any income from the property,
but they concede that the decision to sell was reached prior to completion
of construction. In light of these circumstances, the fact that share-
holder dissention prompted the sale is immaterial."
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requires a subjective intent. Charles C. MacLean, Jr., in his
article in the Harvard Law Review, states, "In common with
the phrases using the word 'purpose', however, 'with a view
to' is subjective in nature, depending for its application on
what is in someone's mind."27 This view is supported by
J. Bruce Donaldson in his article in Taxes, where he states:
One of the most difficult areas of construction under the
collapsible corporation definition is what interpretation to
give the phrase "with a view to". The view requirement
is, of course, a subjective standard, so that--at the very
least-there is present the problem inherent in ascertaining
corporate intentions. 2 8
In their article in the Columbia Law Review, Adrian W. DeWind
and Robert Anthoine had this to say:
Another substantial question is whether a showing of
subjective intent or purpose is compelled by the require-
ment that the corporation be principally used "with a view
to" subsequent "collapse". For the most part, it has
been concluded that the existence of such a purpose or
intent is required, although its existence to a large extent
will have to be shown by objective evidence. 2 9
And further:
[H]owever watered down or "presumed" into existence
the subjective intent may be, its presence is an integral
requirement under the regulations.
These two gentlemen were somewhat prophetic when they
observed "whether the courts will direct much attention to the
subjective purpose requirement remains to be seen." Irving
I. Axelrod in his article in the Southern California Tax Insti-
tute states:
The phrase "with a view to" connotes a subjective stand-
ard. The Commissioner, however, has taken the opposite
27 Collapsible Corporations-The Statute and Regulations, 67 HARV. L. REV.
55 (1953).
28 Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXES 777 (1958).
29 Collapsible Corporations, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 475 (1954).
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approach and attempted to convert the subjective require-
ment into an almost wholly objective one. 3 0
The courts apparently have been doing a little "judicial
legislating." Possibly the reason for this is the fact that
Section 341 is unusual in that it requires a subjective intent
to avoid taxes before its provisions come into operation. It
is true that usually when Congress seeks to dose a tax "loop-
hole" the legislation which is passed doses the "loophole"
without regard to the intent of the parties. Probably Section
341 should not turn on the intent of the parties-but it does.
It is only by total disregard of Congressional intent and the
words "with a view to" that any other opinion can be reached.
The courts seem bent on rectifying this situation through their
decisions.
Section 341, in requiring a subjective intent of tax avoid-
ance, is not alone. The accumulated earnings tax applies
only if the corporation is "formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax. . . by permitting earnings and
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." 31
The real question is not when the intent that is the "view
to sale" must arise, but what intent is actually required. Is
it merely the intent to sell or liquidate, or is it a subjective
intent to avoid taxes through the use of a tax avoidance
"device"? It is undoubtedly the latter. If so, it makes no
difference when the intent arises. If the intent to avoid taxes
is present, Section 341 should apply regardless of when the
intent happens to come into existence. If such intent is not
present, Section 341 should not apply.
To base the ultimate result of a case on when the intent
to sell arises without regard to whether this intent was prompted
by tax avoidance purposes or legitimate purposes is to put
30 The Tax Advantage and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations and Partner-
ships, 34 TAXES 841 (1956). See also, Irving Salem, Collapsible Corpora-
tions: An Analysis of the Past, Present, and Proposed Collapsible Con-
cepts, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 855. Also, see note in 1961-2 DUKE
L. J. at page 323.
31 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532; See also, Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 703-704
dealing with distribution of partnership income.
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the cart before the horse. Whether the requisite intent is
present and not when such intent arose is the ultimate question
to be resolved. In both the Burge and Glickman cases the
requisite intent was found to exist, and the court was correct
in saying that it makes no difference when the intent arose.
In the Jacobson case the requisite intent was not found, and
therefore the Court was correct in holding that Section 341
did not apply. All of these cases reached the correct result,
but this reasoning is misleading. The cases should have
turned on the question of whether or not the requisite intent
was present. The result in the Temkin case offers a slight ray
of hope that the courts will at last reach the results that the
statute contemplates. But in view of the fact that five judges
dissented, I would say that the road to a correct result will be
a rocky one.
The most feasible solution would be to completely revise
Section 341. This was the proposal of the Advisory Groip
on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code.
In 1959 this body recommended that Section 341 be completely
revised. Pursuant to recommendations, the new collapsible
corporation provisions would differ from the old in three
principal respects: (1) It would operate entirely under ob-
jective tests and would not depend upon the intention of the
shareholders. (2) There would be a "'fragmentation" of the
gain. The shareholder would be taxed at ordinary rates only
on the gain attributable to property which, if sold by the
corporation, would have produced ordinary income. (3)
Shareholders would not be taxed at ordinary income rates on
items which would have produced capital gains treatment if
no corporation had been used.
The Advisory Group in its report states:
[T]he law is based upon a determination of the intention
of the parties, a matter that is difficult to determine. It is
not dear to what extent this is a subjective intent test or
an objective intent test, but in any event, it speaks in terms
of a corporation formed or availed of with a view to sale
prior to the realization of a substantial part of the income.
The Advisory Group feels this is an unfortunate test
in an area of this kind which has such drastic effect on the
1962]
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question of whether a substantial gain is capital gain or
ordinary income. We are inclined to feel it is difficult to
administer and that any tax that is based in this area upon
determining whether a person had a particular view when
he started out or not is likely to produce unfair and in-
consistent results.
We would prefer, and our draft provides for, objective
standards that would depend upon the type of assets and
the amount of appreciation that exists in particular assets,
without regard to whether someone was intending to
convert ordinary income into capital gain or happened to
do so without deliberate intention. 2
The recommendation of the Advisory Group was not
adopted. The Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
Mr. Mills, states:
I had thought in this whole area that possibly some type
of consolidation of the thought advanced by the Advisory
Group and the provision of existing law might be more
nearly equitable in many cases than a mere test without
consideration of intent as we do under existing law.
I do not want an individual to get by with minimizing
tax through this device, if that is his intent, when he does
not fall within the rules, and I do not want the individual
who happens to fall within the rules be so heavily burdened
when it is clearly demonstrated that there is no intent of
tax evasion. 3
That the recommendations of the Advisory Group were
not adopted is indeed unfortunate. Their recommendations,
if followed, would have provided a more feasible approach to
the collapsible corporation problem. Naturally, administrative
problems would be created by adoption but this is to be ex-
pected in such an intricate area of taxation. However the in-
currence of administrative problems is a small price to pay if
the uncertainties respecting Section 341 can be reduced.
32 Hearings Before The Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa-
tives, on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K
of The Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 399 (1959).
33 Id. at p. 406.
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Under the Advisory Committee's recommendations, the
definition of a collapsible corporation would be dear and
concise. A collapsible corporation would be defined as "a
corporation the unrealized appreciation on whose Section 343
assets is more than 15 per cent of the excess of the fair market
value of all the assets of the corporation over all its liabili-
ties."34 This definition would leave little room for misinter-
pretation; there would be no need to delve into the intent of
the parties. This is by far the best solution that has as yet been
advanced and its adoption was, and still is, sorely needed.
34 Id. at p. 520.
